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ANTISEMITIZMI NË EVROPË NË SHEKULLIN E 21-TË

АНТИСЕМИТИЗАМ ВО ЕВРОПА ВО 21-ВИ ВЕК

ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE IN THE 21st CENTURY

Abstract

While it is widely believed that antisemitism in Europe is a phenomenon of the past, our analysis shows that it is still present and evolving. As such, it represents a direct threat to democratic values and social cohesion of modern societies. The main aim of this paper is to examine the resurgence of antisemitism in the 21st century across Europe with special focus on its ideological diversity, manifestations and underlying social factors throughout the continent. The study will particularly focus on three main sources of contemporary antisemitism - far-right, far-left, and radical Islamist movements. The paper also provides an analysis on how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, though disguised as political critique, is often used to promote antisemitic messages.

Furthermore, the study explores the important part social media plays in spreading hate speech and encouraging online radicalization and how such activity can lead to real-life violence and intimidation in communities. Finally, the paper explores how populist and nationalist political environments have made antisemitic discourse more acceptable, often using coded language and conspiracy theories aimed at Jews and Jewish institutions. It shows that instead of being diminished, the 21st century antisemitism in Europe, is often minimized, rationalized, or denied. Consequently, the paper emphasizes the urgent need for effective educational, legal, and policy actions to tackle antisemitism.

Keywords: *Antisemitism, Jews, Holocaust, Europe, 21 Century.*

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1. Introduction

While many people tend to believe that antisemitism in Europe in the 21st century is a matter of the past, the truth is that unfortunately this issue is still very much present across the European societies. Although huge efforts have been invested to combat this negative phenomenon, antisemitism in different forms is still present, and represents a serious threat to the well-being and safety of Jewish people throughout the continent. Often, criticism of the state of Israel and its policies is coupled with anti-Jewish sentiments, thus leading to demonization and marginalization of all Jewish individuals who support the state of Israel. The main characteristic of this phenomenon known as “new antisemitism” is emphasized critique of Israel on the one hand, and undermining of human rights abuses in other countries, on the other. Such selective focus on Israel serves the purpose of portraying Jewish people as inherently villainous and untrustworthy, thus additionally contributing to the “normalization” of antisemitic attitudes in European society.

Several factors, such as the rise of far-right and far-left extremism, the prevalence of antisemitic stereotypes in popular culture, the normalization of antisemitic sentiments in mainstream political discourse and the ongoing hate speech on social media, greatly contribute to the persistence of antisemitism across Europe. Unfortunately, such tendencies were also confirmed during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the phenomenon of increasing anti-Semitism through various conspiracy theories has been observed in many European countries. As a result, Jews were again demonized through hate speech, derogatory expressions and the use of racist, xenophobic and antisemitic language.² Moreover, in recent decades we have seen a rise in antisemitic incidents, ranging from vandalism to violent attacks. Therefore, it is important for governments, communities and individuals, to continuously and actively confront and combat antisemitism through effective educational, legal, and policy actions. The main aim of the paper is to analyse the manifestation of antisemitism in nowadays Europe by focusing on its ideological roots and contributing political and social factors.

The structure of the paper is divided into six main sections. After this introductory section, the next one will provide a brief overview of

² For a detailed discussion on the rise of antisemitism during the COVID-19 pandemic see Teuta Agai-Demjaha. “RRITJA E ANTISEMITIZMIT NË KOHËN E PANDEMISË COVID-19.” *Centrum*, No. 14, 2020, pp. 342- 354.

the historical continuity of antisemitism in Europe and its contemporary forms in the 21st century. The section will dedicate special attention to three main sources of contemporary antisemitism: the far right, the far left, and radical Islamist movements. Then, in the following section the paper will shift its focus to the role of social media in spreading antisemitism throughout Europe. The fourth section will analyse how the rise of populist and nationalist movements in several countries in Europe has created environments conducive to antisemitic rhetoric. The next one will dwell on the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on the rise of antisemitic incidents in Europe. Finally, the key findings of the paper will be provided in the concluding section.

2. Historical continuity and contemporary forms

Though the 21st century antisemitism in Europe is in many ways different from the Nazi era one, it still displays some of the historical legacies of the past. Although in a more coded forms, the classical anti-semitic stereotypes that portray Jews as greedy, disloyal, or even conspiratorial are still present in contemporary discourse. Nowadays, these stereotypes have been recycled in narratives about global elites, financial manipulation, or cultural subversion.³ Moreover, in some countries of Eastern Europe, certain nationalist movements have sought to revise or downplay local collaboration in the Holocaust, thus contributing to historical distortion and renewed tensions with Jewish communities.⁴

The three most important sources of the 21st century antisemitism in Europe are: the far right, the far left, and radical Islamist movements. The rise of far-right extremist movements and political parties that adopt anti-Jewish rhetoric represents one of the key manifestations of antisemitism in Europe today. These far-right groups often embrace white nationalist ideologies that blame Jews for immigration, multiculturalism and the decline of "traditional" European values. Such

³ Gerald M. Steinberg, "Applying the IHRA Working Definition to the UN and Human Rights NGOs," in Alvin H. Rosenfeld eds. *Contending with Antisemitism in a Rapidly Changing Political Climate*. Indiana University Press, 2021, p. 45.

⁴ For a detailed discussion on attempts in Eastern Europe to revise or downplay local collaboration during Holocaust see Mary Fulbrook, "Complicity and the Holocaust in Eastern Europe," *Jewish Historical Studies*, Vol. 53, 2021: 115-135. See also Randolph L. Braham, "HUNGARY: THE ASSAULT ON THE HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2014; <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20140318-Holocaust-in-Hungary-Braham-Assault-on-Historical-Memory.pdf>.

groups often propagate conspiracy theories according to which the Jews control governments, media, and financial institutions and use antisemitic tropes to fuel hatred and division within society. For example, the National Front in France⁵ and the Jobbik party in Hungary⁶ have been known to promote antisemitic ideas and engage in Holocaust denial, fostering a climate of fear and intolerance towards Jewish individuals. To better understand the seriousness of such reality, one should note that the electoral results show a permanent increase in support of the Jobbik party. In the parliamentary elections of 2002, the party received only 2.2% of the votes and could not even reach the 5% threshold for entering Parliament, but only eight years later, in the parliamentary elections of April 2010 it took 16.67%.⁷

Differently from the far-right movements that have long been associated with antisemitic violence, the various forms of far-left antisemitism across Europe have manifested themselves only in recent decades. This type of antisemitism is mainly framed through anti-Zionist or anti-imperialist rhetoric, and tends to confuse Jewish identity with the actions of the Israeli state, thus leading to the marginalization and vilification of Jewish individuals and institutions.⁸ In the United Kingdom, it was the controversies within the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn's leadership that brought far-left antisemitism into the public spotlight. A number of party members were accused of antisemitic remarks, including the propagation of conspiratorial stereotypes and the denial of Jewish concerns. According to the 2020 report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the party was responsible for "unlawful acts of harassment and discrimination."⁹

Similarly, certain elements of the radical left in France, have used antisemitic caricatures and slogans during pro-Palestinian

⁵ Daniel Dayan, "Orchestrating Public Blindness in Contemporary France," in Alvin H. Rosenfeld eds. *Contending with Antisemitism in a Rapidly Changing Political Climate*. Indiana University Press, 2021, pp. 211 – 230.

⁶ Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary). See János Gadó, "The Changing Faces of European Antisemitism - the Hungarian Case," in Alvin H. Rosenfeld eds. *Contending with Antisemitism in a Rapidly Changing Political Climate*. Indiana University Press, 2021, pp. 249 – 266.

⁷ András Kovács, *The Stranger at Hand: Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary*, Brill, 2011, p. 199.

⁸ Dave Rich, *The Left's Jewish Problem: Jeremy Corbyn, Israel and Anti-Semitism*, London: Biteback Publishing, 2016, p.17.

⁹ Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), "Investigation into Antisemitism in the Labour Party," October 2020.

demonstrations. It is claimed that the typical profile of an antisemitic actor in Europe today is no longer likely to be a marginal intolerant member of the dominant ethnic group such as a neo-Nazi or skinhead. Instead that would more probably be a radicalized member of an ethnic, usually Arab or Asian minority of the Muslim denomination.¹⁰ Despite efforts to frame these actions as political protest, they often crossed into explicit hate speech and intimidation against Jewish communities. Forms of exclusionary antisemitism under the guise of anti-Zionism were also noticed among certain academic and cultural circles across Europe. For instance, in Germany and Belgium, Jewish scholars and artists have faced calls for boycotts or disinvitations from leftist organizations due to their perceived support for Israel, regardless of their actual views.¹¹ Consequently, although the tone and framing of the far-left antisemitism is different from the racialized hatred of the far right, today it presents a significant and growing challenge to pluralistic and inclusive democratic discourse in Europe.

Radical Islamist antisemitism nowadays represents one of the most violent and visible forms of antisemitic expression in Europe in the 21st century. It has often fuelled a number of deadly attacks, targeting Jewish schools, synagogues, and markets. It should be noted that Radical Islamist antisemitism is not representative of the broader Muslim communities across Europe. Still, motivated by a combination of extremist religious doctrine, anti-Zionist propaganda, and imported narratives from Middle Eastern conflicts, some individuals have carried out attacks explicitly targeting Jews and Jewish institutions.¹² In addition to physical violence, nowadays radical Islamist antisemitism is often fuelled by online radicalization, especially through social media platforms. Conspiracy theories about Jewish control, Holocaust denial, and antisemitic interpretations of religious texts are heavily propagated online. This rhetoric draws heavily from a fusion of Islamist ideology and modern anti-Zionist narratives, often portraying Jews as eternal enemies of Islam, and conflating local Jewish communities with the

¹⁰ Dirk Jacobs et al., “The impact of the conflict in Gaza on antisemitism in Belgium,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2011, p. 343.

¹¹ Zev Stub, “German cancelation of Israeli professor’s talk highlights widening academic boycotts,” *The Times of Israel*, 5 December 2024; <https://www.timesofisrael.com/german-cancelation-of-israeli-academics-talk-highlights-widening-academic-boycotts/>.

¹² For a detailed explanation see for instance Lorenzo G. Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West*, Columbia University Press, 2020.

actions of the Israeli state.¹³ Radical Islamist antisemitism has posed significant challenges for European governments, Jewish communities, and Muslim leaders, many of whom have actively condemned the violence and worked to counter radicalization. Nonetheless, the threat remains persistent, highlighting the need for targeted counter-extremism strategies and interfaith engagement to dismantle the ideological foundations of this hatred.

This resurgence of the far right, the far left, and radical Islamist extremism poses a serious threat to the safety and security of Jewish communities in Europe, as it emboldens individuals to commit acts of violence and discrimination against them. According to an overview of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on antisemitic Incidents in the European Union, thousands of violent incidents have been recorded, including multiple terrorist attacks targeting Jews and Jewish institutions during the period 2009–2019. In 2018 alone, fourteen EU Member States¹⁴ have reported cases of antisemitic hate crimes, with France and Germany having the highest number.¹⁵ One of the most poignant examples of antisemitic violence was the 2012 Toulouse school shooting, where a radicalized Islamist gunman Mohammed Merah killed a rabbi and three children outside Ozar Hatorah Jewish school.¹⁶ This act was then followed by a string of other violent assaults, including the 2014 attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels by Mehdi Nemmouche, a former ISIS fighter, which left four people dead.¹⁷ Similar terrorist attack happened in 2015 at the Hyper Cacher kosher supermarket siege in Paris, in which Islamist extremist Amedy Coulibaly murdered four Jewish hostages.¹⁸ On the other hand, during the Gaza conflict in 2014, the far left organized several rallies in Paris

¹³ Gilles Kepel, *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*. Princeton University Press, 2017.

¹⁴ Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden

¹⁵ According to the official data, France has reported 588 and Germany 307 cases of antisemitic hate crimes. For more details see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *OVERVIEW OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS RECORDED IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2009–2019*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020.

¹⁶ Scott Sayare and Steven Erlanger, “4 Killed at Jewish School in Southwestern France,” *The New York Times*, 19 March 2012; <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/world/europe/gunman-kills-3-at-a-jewish-school-in-france.html>.

¹⁷ BBC, “Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect ‘admitted attack,’” *The British Broadcasting Corporation*, 1 June 2014; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27654505>.

¹⁸ BBC News, “Paris Jewish supermarket reopens after hostage siege,” *The British Broadcasting Corporation*, 15 March 2015; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31896550>.

and other cities that escalated into violence targeting synagogues and Jewish-owned shops, with chants like “Death to Jews” reported by observers and media.¹⁹

Although Hungary did not officially report any antisemitic incidents, such cases of antisemitic hate crimes did happen, and were mainly fuelled by the rhetoric of far-right parties such as Jobbik. In 2012, Márton Gyöngyösi, leader of Jobbik, which was then Hungary's third-strongest political party, urged the government to draw up lists of Jews who pose a "national security risk" to the country.²⁰ On the other hand, paramilitary groups often linked to Jobbik, such as the Hungarian National Socialist Action Group and the neo-Arrow Cross group called Hungarian National Frontline, have often organized provocative marches in Jewish neighbourhoods and glorified Hungary's fascist *Arrow Cross* regime, responsible for the deportation and murder of Jews during World War II.⁵ In addition, on 6th of March 2020, gravestones in the Jewish cemetery in southern Hungary were pushed over and severely damaged.²¹

3. Social media and the spread of antisemitism

In addition to many of its benefits, the digital age has unfortunately also transformed the landscape of hate speech. Social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram have become primary tools for spreading antisemitic ideologies. Unlike traditional forms of antisemitism, which often relied on localized rhetoric or underground networks, digital platforms now allow antisemitic narratives to circulate globally, rapidly, and anonymously. Online anonymity enables individuals and groups to disseminate harmful content with limited accountability, easily reinforcing radical views without counter-narratives. Extremist groups, including far-right, far-left, and radical Islamist actors, exploit these networks to propagate age-old tropes - such as

¹⁹ Times of Israel Staff, “Anti-Israel protesters trap hundreds in Paris synagogue,” *The Times of Israel*, 13 July 2014; <https://www.timesofisrael.com/clashes-in-paris-as-thousands-march-against-israel-offensive/>.

²⁰ “Hungarian far-right leader requests ‘lists of Jews’,” *EUROACTIV*, 27 November 2012; <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungarian-far-right-leader-requests-lists-of-jews/>.

²¹ Marcy Oster, “Jewish cemetery in southern Hungary vandalized,” *Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA)*, 16 March 2020; <https://www.jta.org/quick-reads/jewish-cemetery-in-southern-hungary-vandalized>.

Jewish control of global finance, media manipulation, and Holocaust denial - often under the guise of criticism of Israel or "anti-elitism."²² The rise of meme culture and coded language allows antisemitism to spread in ways that are difficult to monitor and moderate. Algorithms designed to maximize engagement often prioritize sensational, polarizing content. As a result, conspiracy theories - including antisemitic ones - gain disproportionate visibility. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Jews were scapegoated as alleged creators or profiteers of the virus, reviving age-old accusations of malevolent intent.²³

Online radicalization has also translated into offline violence, with attackers in cities like Toulouse and Halle citing internet forums as sources of ideological reinforcement. As already mentioned, in 2012 a radicalized Islamist gunman Mohammed Merah killed a rabbi and three children outside a school in Toulouse. As it was shown later, Merah was heavily influenced by online jihadist propaganda, including videos from Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups that portrayed Jews as enemies of Islam and humanity. He filmed his own attacks using a GoPro camera and cited revenge for Palestinian children as a justification - a narrative often amplified in radical Islamist online forums and video platforms that traffic in antisemitic conspiracy theories.²⁴ On the other hand, in 2019, Stephan Balliet - a far-right extremist attacked a synagogue in Halle, Germany, on Yom Kippur, livestreaming the attempt. Though he failed to breach the building, he killed two bystanders. The attacker was heavily influenced by online platforms underscoring the link between digital radicalization and real-world violence. The Halle attack reflected and evidenced several trends, including the internationalization of right-wing terrorism and lone-actor terrorists fashioning their own weapons. Luckily, the attack failed because it appeared that the terrorist has used homemade firearms for the first time.²⁵ It is worth mentioning though that despite these challenges, social media can also play a role in countering antisemitism

²² See Michael Bossetta, *Antisemitism on Social Media Platforms: Placing the Problem into Perspective*. In M. Hübscher, & S. von Mering eds., *Antisemitism on Social Media*, Routledge, 2022: 227-241.

²³ For details see Agai-Demjaha, 2020.

²⁴ BBC News, "Toulouse school shootings: Who was behind the attacks?" The British Broadcasting Corporation, 19 March 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17440561>.

²⁵ Daniel Koehler, "The Halle, Germany, Synagogue Attack and the Evolution of the Far-Right Terror Threat," CTC SENTINEL, Volume 12, Issue 11, December 2019: 14 – 20; <https://etc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CTC-SENTINEL-112019.pdf>.

- through education, digital literacy initiatives, and the amplification of positive narratives. However, without comprehensive and proactive measures, social media will likely continue to serve as both a catalyst and echo chamber for antisemitic ideologies in Europe.

4. Political climate, populism and nationalism

The rise of populist and nationalist movements represents another source of antisemitism that has anti-Jewish rhetoric in several European countries. In countries like Hungary, Poland, and other Central and Eastern European nations, political leaders have often employed antisemitic stereotypes to rally nationalist sentiment. Such tropes were especially targeting the Jewish philanthropist George Soros who was portrayed as a manipulative globalist. Undoubtedly, these narratives also usually invoke fears of economic exploitation, cultural assimilation, and foreign interference. This phenomenon has been also visible in some Western European countries, in which the mainstreaming of anti-globalist discourse has in some cases intersected with antisemitic motifs. Political parties like France's National Rally, Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Italy's League have officially claimed to support Israel and denounced Islamist extremism. However, individuals within their ranks have on the other hand often flirted with or tolerated antisemitic elements. This shows how antisemitism could become a flexible tool - one that can be denied in public, yet exploited for political gain.

One of the most interesting cases is the Hungarian government which has during electoral campaigns frequently run billboard campaigns targeting Soros and associating him with migration conspiracies. Many critics, including the European Parliament, have noted that such antisemitic messages, tend to manipulate citizens by evoking traditional fears of Jewish influence.²⁶ It is interesting that some regimes that claim to strongly support the Jewish communities have at the same time restricted historical inquiry into the Holocaust or downplayed domestic antisemitism. In Hungary, such offensive against the historical memory of the Holocaust was spearheaded not only by the so-called "historical revisionists," but also by respectable public figures - members and

²⁶ Lydia Gall, "Hungarian Government Stoops to New Low with Hate Campaign," Human Rights Watch, 17 July 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/12/hungarian-government-stoops-new-low-hate-campaign>.

heads of government, parliamentarians, and high-ranking officers. It represented a clear attempt to safeguard the national honour of Hungary by absolving their nation of any historical responsibility for the Holocaust.²⁷ As already shown, such selective memory politics often instrumentalizes Jewish suffering to bolster nationalist narratives, undermining genuine reconciliation and education efforts.

5. The role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Tensions in the Middle East, particularly during periods of conflict between Israel and Palestinians, represent another important source of antisemitism especially in Western Europe. For instance, during the Israeli military operation Cast Lead, which took place in the Gaza Strip from 27th of December 2008 to 18th of January 2009, protest demonstrations were organized in many large cities in Belgium. During this period, Jewish communities across Belgium have reported spikes in harassment, threats, and vandalism, clearly showing that the conflict in Gaza has increased the number of antisemitic incidents in Belgium.²⁸ Similar trends were witnessed during the 2014 Gaza war or the 2021 Israel-Hamas conflict. In both cases, demonstrations initially intended as political protests against Israeli actions, have in some occasions turned into antisemitic outbursts of chants and slogans that target Jews broadly.²⁹ While it is essential to distinguish legitimate criticism of Israeli government policies from antisemitism, this boundary is often crossed. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism highlights instances where Israel is demonized, held to double standards, or denied its right to exist - all of which are increasingly common in political discourse and social media.³⁰

The clear causality between the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the rise of antisemitism in Europe was visible during the Israel-Gaza conflict in 2021. For instance, during this period the antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom surged, and the record number of anti-Jewish acts, including assaults and the vandalism of synagogues was

²⁷ Braham, 2014, pp. 9 – 10.

²⁸ Jacobs et al., 2011, p. 358

²⁹ BBC News, “Anti-Semitism: Dramatic rise in 2021, Israeli report says,” The British Broadcasting Corporation, 27 April 2022; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-61228552>.

³⁰ The World Jewish Congress, “Antisemitism defined: Double standards against the State of Israel,” The World Jewish Congress, 04 May 2022; <https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/defining-antisemitism-double-standards-against-the-state-of-israel>.

reported. Some protestors shouted explicitly antisemitic slogans and threatened Jewish neighborhoods, illustrating the dangerous spillover from geopolitical tensions.³¹ Similarly, there had been a dramatic rise in reported antisemitic attacks throughout Europe since the Hamas attacks on 7th of October, and Israel's military campaign in Gaza. According to a survey conducted by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), since then Europe has been facing a 'wave of antisemitism'. The FRA also said that there had been a dramatic rise in reported antisemitic attacks since the Gaza war began, thus severely limiting the ability of Jewish people in EU countries to live in safety and with dignity.³² Such reality places Jewish communities in a precarious position. Many European Jews feel compelled to defend their right to safety and identity without being drawn into polarizing geopolitical debates. The conflation of Jewish identity with Israeli policy contributes to a climate of suspicion and hostility that undermines community cohesion and interfaith dialogue.

Conclusion

While it is widely believed that antisemitism in 21st-century Europe is a phenomenon of the past, our analysis has shown that it is still present and evolving. Though in forms different from the Nazi era, antisemitism today continues to threaten the safety, dignity, and integration of Jewish communities across the continent. As such, it represents a direct threat to democratic values and social cohesion of modern societies across Europe. The paper has shown that far-right, far-left, and radical Islamist movements represent three main sources of contemporary antisemitism across Europe. Simultaneously, paper has shown how populist and nationalist political environments have made antisemitic discourse more acceptable, often using coded language and conspiracy theories aimed at Jews and Jewish institutions.

Moreover, geopolitical developments, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, continue to serve as flashpoints for antisemitic incidents across Europe. In these moments, Jewish individuals and institutions are often scapegoated for political grievances, reflecting an enduring failure to distinguish between criticism of a state and hostility

³¹ BBC News, 27 April 2022.

³² BBC News, "Europe facing 'wave of antisemitism', survey finds," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 July 2024; <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c147w9572dvo>.

toward a people. The paper concludes that social media has created new possibilities for spreading hate speech and encouraging online radicalization. Often this digital dimension has translated into real-world violence, further endangering Jewish life and cultural presence in Europe. The paper therefore concludes that contemporary antisemitism is not confined to the margins but is embedded in political, cultural, and digital arenas, where it is often minimized, rationalized, or denied. Consequently, the paper emphasizes the urgent need for effective educational, legal, and policy actions to tackle antisemitism.

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