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**NDIKIMI I ZVARRITJES SË BISEDIMEVE KOSOVË-SERBI NË
SIGURINË KOMBËTARE TË KOSOVËS**

**ВЛИЈАНИЕТО НА ОДОЛГОВЛЕКУВАЊЕТО НА РАЗГОВОРИТЕ
КОСОВО-СРБИЈА ВРЗ НАЦИОНАЛНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ НА
КОСОВО**

**THE IMPACT OF THE PROCRASTINATION OF THE KOSOVO-
SERBIA TALKS ON KOSOVO'S NATIONAL SECURITY**

Abstract

After the end of the war in 1999 between Kosovo and Serbia and the international factor, the tensions between these two countries have been constantly worsening. Due to this worsening of the situation, have been engaged the diplomacy of the United States of America and the European Union on one side and the Russian Federation on the other side. During this two-decade period, several meetings have been held between Kosovar and Serbian negotiators under the supervision of emissaries from the European Union and United States of America. During these negotiations, several agreements were reached which are being implemented by both countries. Even against reaching these agreements, the issue of National Security of the Republic of Kosovo continues to be fragile due to the operation of parallel structures in Serbian enclaves, the implication of Serbian politics in organized crime and the issue of Russian influence in the Northern part of Mitrovica seriously threatens the national security of the Republic of Kosovo. Therefore, in this scientific paper we will mainly talk about the issues related to the problem that is mentioned above, and also can affect the security of our state and the states on the Western Balkan Countries and Europe.

Keywords: *national security, northern Kosovo, Serbian politics, Russian influence, organized crime.*

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1. Entry

The dialogue between the Kosovar side and the Serbian side, which is taking place in Brussels, Belgium, mediated and facilitated by the officials of the European Union, with the help of the United States of America, aims to reach a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia and the promotion of regional cooperation in achieving the progress of the European agenda in order to regulate and advance the lives of the citizens of both countries and create more favorable conditions for free movement, economy and science. These talks are being held on the basis of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The same Resolution was approved by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, respecting the Resolution for Kosovo of the UN General Assembly, dated September 09, 2010, based on Article 65.1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo and Article 6.1 of the Regulation of the Assembly, in a plenary meeting held on March 10, 2011 (Parlamenti i Kosovës, 2011). Negotiations between two states that have gone through war, is the most difficult issue to fix. According to this contention, negotiation between two states can be called the art of bringing peace. Markhof, in his book “Processes of International Negotiations” emphasizes that negotiations are essential mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and maintaining stability in international relations. Negotiations can and should contribute to predictability, equality and security between states. To achieve these goals, negotiations become important confidence-building measures (Markhof, 1986). According to Harwell in his book “The Serbia - Kosovo Dialogue: Ripe for Resolution?”, he notes that the dispute between Serbia and Kosovo is often referred to as a “frozen conflict”, but this term encourages a sense of false security (Hartwell, 2021). From these points of view, bearing in mind the issue of security between the two countries, which are still developing the dialogue for an agreement acceptable to both parties, the security of the Republic of Kosovo, during this period, may be vulnerable to due to the situation created in the North of Mitrovica. Recently, this situation has been created as a result of nationalist declarations by the rulers of Serbia, the ineffectiveness of fighting organized crime, Russian influence and the possibility of the involvement of Kosovo Serb politicians in organized crime and non-respect of the Republic's constitution of Kosovo. Therefore, the longer the talks between the two countries last, the more dangerous and vulnerable the security situation in the country and the region will be due to the reasons mentioned above. After the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) about the act of declaration of independence of Kosovo, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on September 9, 2010, approved the resolution sponsored by the then 27 countries of the European Union and Serbia, which paved the way for the beginning of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, facilitated by the EU. This resolution, approved by consensus by the UN

General Assembly, welcomed the opinion of the ICJ, as well as welcomed the readiness of the European Union to facilitate the dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia, stressing that this process would serve as a factor of peace, security and stability in the region. This process, they said, will promote cooperation, improve the lives of citizens and help both countries make progress on their way to the European Union. As a result, on March 10, 2011, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a resolution which mandated the Government of the Republic of Kosovo to start technical talks with Serbia, as well as asking it to report on a continuous basis on the progress of the process. Through this resolution, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo also obliged the executive to submit the basic document for the dialogue within the legal deadlines, specifying the general principles of the technical dialogue, the objectives as well as the non-negotiable issues. In addition to the technical talks, at the end of 2012 began normalization of relations (Hoti, 2020). On October 18, 2012, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a new resolution through which it supported the beginning of the political dialogue, again mandating the Government of Kosovo to lead this process. (Instituti Demokratik i Kosovës, 2018). Kosovo, together with the other countries of the Western Balkans, shares its perspective in the European future. This was discussed during the summits in Thessaloniki, Greece in 2003, Sofia, and most recently in 2020 at the Zagreb and Bulgaria in 2018, Croatia summit. At the last summit, their strong support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans was reconfirmed (European Parliament, 2021).

2. National Security Situation in the Republic of Kosovo

The concept of security is a challenging concept because when we talk about security we are dealing with the assessment of threat and risk. The Republic of Kosovo continues to face various problems and challenges related to the security of the country. The main problem in Kosovo remains organized crime in the northern part of the country, the parallel system of the Serbian community, non-liberalization of visas, propaganda, misinformation which is created through electronic media and social portals initiated by Serbia and the Russian Federation, etc. Recently, the situation in the Republic of Kosovo has been somewhat tense due to recent developments in North Mitrovica. Mitrovica, a city located in the northern part of the country divided into two parts, the southern and northern divided into two ethnicities, where the southern part is inhabited by the Albanian community, overwhelmingly while the northern part is inhabited by the Serbian community, about 28,530, Albanians about 4,900, Bosnians about 1,000, Gorans about 580, Turks about 210, Roma about 200 and Ashkali about 40 inhabitants (OSCE, 2018). The delay in the dialogue between the Kosovar side and the Serbian side has a negative effect on the creation of a calm and safe environment in Kosovo and in the countries

of the Western Balkans. This is a consequence of non-respect and implementation of the laws and the constitution by the Kosovar Serbs in the Northern part of Mitrovica and the Serbian enclaves. As a result of this delay, the Republic of Kosovo has delays in membership in international organizations such as Interpol, the European Union, the obstacle of some European Union states in visa liberalization due to the undefined status with Serbia, membership in the European Union and the Organization of United Nations.

3. Operation of Parallel Structures in the North of Mitrovica and in other parts of the Republic of Kosovo

The parallel structures that operate in a state are structures that represent “a state within a state”. This sociopolitical phenomenon related to popular sovereignty is the emergence and operation of parallel institutions in opposition to those legitimate institutions of that state. This type of establishment of these institutions can also be called a structure with an ideological foundation. The treatment of the illegal structures of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, as well as the attitude of Serbia and the international community towards them, is more than necessary, since these illegal structures are the greatest danger not only to the citizenship of Kosovo, but also to stability in the region. Serbia's attitude towards them is destructive, since it not only founded them, but also financed them (Sopjani, 2012). The illegal, parallel structures in the Republic of Kosovo have functioned with all the vital organs of a parallel state, they are; Parallel courts, parallel security structures, parallel structures of public services, and other illegal structures. Bekim Bislimi, a journalist for “Radio Free Europe”, in his article “Millions from Serbia for the strengthening of parallel structures in Kosovo”, has stated that, from its budget for 2021, Serbia has allocated 91.8 million Euros for the financing of parallel structures and activities her in Kosovo (Milionat e Serbisë për fuqizimin e strukturave paralele në Kosovë | ILLYRIA, 2021)². Besnik, in the “Radio Free Europe” newspaper, in the article “Parallel structures continue to take millions from Serbia”³, stated that the Government of Serbia, from its budget for 2022, has allocated 96.1 million euros for Kosovo. Where does Serbia's money go? Of the 96.1 million euros that the Government of Serbia has allocated for Kosovo this year, the Office for Kosovo of this government receives the largest part: 68.3 million euros. Most of this amount, 46 million euros, goes to, as it says, “supporting the functioning of institutions and organizations in Kosovo”, while 22.3 million Euros goes to “supporting the improvement of the quality

² <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/serbia-strukturat-paralele-kosove-/31356415.html>, last seen on 13/09/2023 at 17:00

³ <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/strukturat-paralele-serbe-ne-kosove/31704547.html>, last seen on 13/09/2023 at 18:00

of life of Serbs and non-Albanians”. Within the budget of the Ministry of Education of Serbia, for “supporting the work of the University of Pristina with temporary headquarters in Mitrovica”, Serbia allocates about 26.6 million Euros. About 373,700 Euros are allocated for “Administrative Districts in Kosovo, created for the purpose of performing the tasks of the state administration outside the headquarters of the state administration bodies”. Within the funds dedicated to the cabinet of the minister without portfolio for Innovation and Technological Development, about 237,000 Euros go to the plan “to support the improvement of innovative capacities” in Kosovo. The Ministry of Culture and Information of Serbia has said that it will allocate 87,118 Euros for “support for informing citizens in the Serbian language” in Kosovo. The Directorate for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities of Serbia, meanwhile, gives 538,135 Euros for “support for the clergy and the monastery in Kosovo”⁴. (Parallel structures continue to receive millions from Serbia (evropaelire.org, 2022). Kosovo's budget for 2023 is 3.21 billion Euros (Kosovo Assembly, 2023), according to the Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, Serbia, in the North of Mitrovica, spends about 500 million Euros in a year. (GIATOC, 2019). According to these data, Serbia spends 1/6 of Kosovo's annual budget in North Mitrovica. In the Government of Serbia, there is the Office for “Kosovo and Metohija”⁵ which is represented by Petar Petković, according to this office based on the Serbian Official Gazette 75/12, 123/12 and 13 of the Government of Serbia, this in Kosovo, has the following powers: Functioning of the Institutions of the Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija; education, health, social policy, culture, infrastructure, system of local self-government and telecommunications in the Serbian areas of Kosovo and Metohija, the functioning of the Slavic church in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija ,restoration and protection of spiritual and cultural heritage, financial, legal, technical personnel assistance in all important fields for Serbs and other non-Albanian communities in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, cooperation with the Commissariat for displaced persons, which deals with persons who have been displaced from Kosovo and Metohija, cooperation with the civil and military mission of the United Nations in Kosovo and Metohija (UNMIK and KFOR) based on Resolution no. 1244, of the Security Council ,the office performs professional and operational tasks in the process of negotiations with the temporary institutions of self-government in Pristina, which are related to implementation of the agreements reached in the process of dialogue and negotiations, preparation of proposals for Government acts, implementation and monitoring of the implementation of Government acts, coordination with authorities and organizations regarding the

⁴ Strukturat paralele vazhdojnë t'i marrin milionat nga Serbia (evropaelire.org) , 2022) , last seen on 13/09/2023 at 19:00

⁵ <https://kim.gov.rs/#> , last seen on 13/09/2023 at 19:30

negotiation process and the implementation of approved Government acts, as well as other tasks (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2012).

3.1 Parallel Courts

After the end of the war in Kosovo, since 1999, members of the Serbian community have established parallel courts, starting in the Northern part of Mitrovica. Throughout time, the parallel courts have, among other activities, handled civil-legal proceedings, investigative and criminal proceedings, inheritance cases, authentication of documents and requests for judicial assistance from Serbian and foreign courts. In addition to the parallel courts operating in the territory of Kosovo, the municipal and district courts within Serbia still seek to exercise their jurisdiction in Kosovo. For example, parallel district courts in Serbia still act as appellate courts for cases heard by parallel courts in Kosovo and first-instance courts in serious criminal cases heard in Kosovo (OSCE, 2007). **Mitrovica Region:** the parallel court of the region of Mitrovica operates in the municipality of Zvečan (for the District of Mitrovica) and the parallel municipal court in Leposaviq. **Prishtina region:** for the Prishtina region, there is a municipal court parallel to those of the Prishtina district and the prosecutor's office in Nis, Serbia. The liaison office with three employees is located in Graçanica and is mainly involved in the administrative matters of the court (eg verification of the authenticity of documents, verification of contract signatures). It uses the seals of the Republic of Serbia in the performance of its duties and, as the case may be, a judge from the court of Nis works in the office. **Gjilan Region;** the parallel court of Gjilan is located in Vranje, Serbia, the Parallel Municipal Court of Ferizaj in Leskovc, Serbia, and the parallel Municipal Court of Kamenica in Jagodina, Serbia. The parallel Leskovci branch is located in Shtërpce, Kosovo, about 400 meters from the municipality building, with a judge and seven other employees (including administrative staff and a security guard). The parallel court of Leskovci, Serbia, hears civil cases, while criminal cases are divided between it and the District Court of Pristina in Nis, Serbia, on the issue of jurisdiction under Serbian law. However, the main role of the court branch in Shtërpce seems to be administrative, such as issuing various certificates (eg that a person has never been prosecuted by the Serbian authorities), verifying the authenticity of documents and issues related to authorizations of driving. **The Peja, Gjakova and Prizren region:** the parallel courts of the Prizren region are located in Pozharevc, Serbia, while the parallel courts responsible for the region of Peja and Gjakova are located in Leskovc, Serbia. In matters of justice, progress has been made by reaching the Agreement on the implementation of justice, at the meeting of Prime Ministers and SP Mogherini in Brussels on February 9-10, 2015. The agreement on the implementation of justice provides for the implementation of Kosovo's legislation and the functioning of the system unitary justice in the northern part of Kosovo, as well as the

establishment of a Basic Court and a Basic Prosecution Office for the Mitrovica region (covering seven municipalities) in accordance with the law of Kosovo on courts (Kuvendi i Kosovë, 2018)

3.2 Parallel Security Structures

The Government of Serbia in its activities in Kosovo continues to support illegal structures, offering financial support starting from the judiciary, health, education and other municipal services. In addition to the action of the structures of the Serbian MUP, there are also doubts about the presence of the Intelligence Agency of Serbia - BIA. Here we should also mention the presence of the military counterintelligence service and the continuous operation of the reserve component of the army based on the past model of the former territorial defense, where these members would be mobilized “in case it is required”. The development of these structures has become the main cause for the lack of rule of law and order in the north of the country, causing insecurity for a very long time (Grainca.V., & Përteshi.S., 2011). Parallel structures of Serbia called “Civilna Zaštita,” Civil Protection” and earlier called “Čuvari mosta”, or “Bridge Guards”, functioned within the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, functioned in North Mitrovica, has functioned as the local police, divided into special units for the purpose of protecting the local Serbs. This security organization has employed over 500 people from the Serbian community, where, the vast majority of them had military experience and were in search of rescue. During the years 2008, 2013 and 2014, their number has increased to 751 because new members have been accepted. The agreement for the integration of the civil security units in the institutions of Kosovo was approved on March 26, 2015 in the framework of the Brussels dialogue. In this agreement, the Government of Kosovo has promised to find jobs within its institutions for 483 people, while Belgrade must stop financing these institutions in the North of Mitrovica. The integration procedure will be the same as that of police officers and this list is of 751 people recommended by Belgrade who have been integrated in the institutions of Kosovo (Stakić. S., & Bjeloš. M., 2016).

3.3 Parallel Health System

In the Republic of Kosovo, Serbian health institutions continue to function. Such institutions are outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health of Kosovo and do not report to this ministry at all. These institutions do not even report on the number of their employees who serve there. The largest number of these health care facilities are located in the north of Mitrovica, namely in four Serbian municipalities. Also, in northern Mitrovica there is a hospital that offers free services to all members of the Serbian community. Patients are provided with health cards issued by the Republic of Serbia. In the north of Mitrovica there is also the Office of the Republican

Fund for Health Insurance of the Republic of Serbia, with its branches in Zubin Potok, Prilluzhe, Leposavić and Zvečan. In the Municipality of North Mitrovica there is also a polyclinic that offers health services to the students of this part. In “Miners Hill”, where Serbs and Albanians live, services are provided by a health center. In the municipality of Zvečan, there is a health center and 4 clinics for the provision of primary health care. About 155 health workers are employed in this municipality, including doctors, nurses and other accompanying staff. In the municipality of Zubin Potok there is a health center and 6 clinics for the provision of primary health care. A total of 77 health workers are employed in this municipality. Likewise, in the village of Cabër, populated by Albanians, there is also a health center that functions within the health system of Kosovo. In the municipality of Leposavici there is a health center and 8 clinics, of which only two are functional. There are a total of 135 health workers in this municipality. Meanwhile, a medical center is in the village of Bisticë e Shala, populated by Albanians, and operates within the health system of Kosovo. In the municipality of Shtërpce there is a family medicine center and 7 health centers in villages populated by Albanians and Serbs. This municipality has a total of 22 health workers. In the municipality of Kllokot there are two medical centers, which are managed by Serbs. There are a total of 15 health workers. In Partesh, the health care system includes a Serbian-run maternity hospital, as well as three health care facilities in the villages of Pasjan, Budrigë e Poshtme, and Partesh. There are 8 medical centers in Ranillug, all financed by the Municipality's budget. There are a total of 28 health workers in this municipality. In Novobërde is the Main Center of Family Medicine (QKMF) which operates within the health system of Kosovo. Meanwhile, there are 9 other medical centers, 8 of which operate with the Serbian system. There are a total of 36 health workers in this municipality. Finally, in the Municipality of Graçaniča there is a Clinical Hospital Center as well as two hospital institutions, one of pediatrics and one of internal medicine. There are also 15 ambulances in the villages of this municipality. After the end of the war in 1999, Graçanica became the main health center for Serbs, as this center and other institutions were moved from Pristina. But the Graçanica hospital, which also operates under the umbrella of the Serbian health system, does not have its own facility and operates in several metal containers. In 2018, the Government of Serbia promised to allocate funds for the construction of the hospital, but so far only the location where this facility will be built has been determined (KDI,2020).

3.4 Parallel Education

The right to education is a fundamental right of every human being, because with education, he or she is qualified for achievements in life. This right is allowed by the constitutions of every country. Regarding the use of language, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (Kuvendi

i Kosovës, 2008) the official languages in the Republic of Kosovo are the Albanian language and the Serbian language, although the Serbian minority in Kosovo does not reach 5% of the population of Kosovo. The Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status of official languages at the municipal level or will be in official use at any level in accordance with the law (Constitution, Article 3 par. 1 and 2). In article, 57 par.1, it is defined that “for residents who belong to the same national or ethnic, linguistic or religious group, traditionally present in the territory of the Republic of Kosovo (communities), enjoy special rights defined by this Constitution, along with basic human rights and freedoms, defined in Chapter II of this Constitution”. When it comes to the educational rights of members of minorities and communities, the Constitution (Article 59 par. 2, 3, 4) has determined that they “receive public education at all levels, in one of the official languages of Kosovo, according to their choice of them, at the pre-primary, primary and secondary level, in their language, up to the extent determined by law, where the threshold for the establishment of parallel or special schools for this purpose will be lower than the one usually determined for educational institutions. They have the right to establish and manage private institutions of education and training, for which public financial assistance can be given, in accordance with the law and international standards” (Fetahu.A., 2019). Therefore, like the parallel health system, since 1999 parallel education has been operating in Kosovo with the Serbian curriculum. In the framework of this education, in Kosovo, in addition to Serbian students, in the region of Dragash, some of the schools in the villages of Gora are operating with this system. Below are the statistics of primary schools and Serbian and Goran students who are learning the Serbian curriculum in primary schools of the Serbian parallel system, in the region of Ferizaj, Peja, Gjilan, Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova and Mitrovica there are 69 schools primary, 11941 students, 1955 teachers and 436 technical assistants and there are 33 secondary schools, 5515 students, 1186 teachers and 189 technical assistants (European Center for Minority Issues Kosovo, 2018). Likewise, in North Mitrovica, the system of higher education, called the University of Mitrovica, in which there are 10 faculties, is functioning; economic, medicine, agriculture, law, mathematical sciences, education, sports and physical education, technical sciences, art and philosophy. Over 9000 students are registered in these faculties, over 700 professors are employed (<https://pr.ac.rs/>, 2022)⁶

⁶ (<https://pr.ac.rs/>,

4. Involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Politics and Their Influence

In addition to the parallel Serbian institutions that operate in the territory of the Republic of Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Church also has a special role, which, in addition to being called to take care of and preach the religion for the spiritual issue of its believers, this institution, most of cases has influenced the policy and decision-making of the Serbian policy towards Kosovo and its population. Outstanding among the monuments of cultural heritage in Kosovo are undoubtedly those belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church. So far they are the only cultural heritage in Kosovo represented on the UNESCO World Heritage List. The four monuments included in this list are: the monastery of Deçan in Deçan, the Patriarchate of Pejë in Pejë, the monastery of Graçanica near Pristina and the church of Bogorodica Ljeviska in Prizren. Beyond its universally recognized aesthetic value, an additional factor that gives exceptional importance to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage is the importance it has for the Serbian nation, a nation that sees religion, meaning the Serbian Orthodox Church, as an indispensable component of her identity (RIDEA, 2019). In most cases, from the side of the Serbian clerics, during their statements before the media or social media, there have been no shortage of statements that had political content towards the Kosovar people. In 2003, clerics from the Serbian Orthodox Church declared that “Kosovo and Metohija is the holy land of the Serbian people. What Jerusalem means to the Jewish people, this is Kosovo to the Serbs? Moreover, Kosovo, like Jerusalem, is not a matter of geography or demographics. It's a matter of identity (Perica.V, 2019). In 2003, the clerics of the Serbian Orthodox Church continue with their statements, where we can point out “It is a fact that the centuries-old Serbian Covenant of Kosovo is an expression of our human and Christian memory” (Sagau, 2019). Sagau, in his article, continues with the text that Zorica Kubarič mentioned in 2014 that “The overlapping of religious and national identity, as well as the ties between the church and the state, make it difficult to separate religious issues from political ones. [...] The members of the Serbian Orthodox Church are determined to protect their graves, not to betray the faith of their ancestors and not to leave the place that is both their home and their grave. The power of the collective unconscious rises from the commitment of Kosovo”. Armend Bekaj in his article “Kosova and the Divine Claim of the Serbian Orthodox Church” pointed out that in the name of the claim of “divine innocence, it turns out that “the Serbian Orthodox Church, in the name of the freedom to practice religion and the protection of cultural heritage, enjoys supra-constitutional rights. Furthermore, those rights cannot even be unilaterally waived by the Kosovo authorities. This is also related to the rule of law. Even, for the international community, its protection will

always be a criterion that will inform the implementation of the rule of law in the country” (Bekaj.A., 2021).

Laurie Johnston, in his book “Understanding the War in Kosovo” noted that “the region for the Orthodox Serbs has an intense religious significance, full of symbolism, being considered the Jerusalem of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the core of the Serbs” (Johnston, 2003). Slavisa Orlovic, said Why is Kosovo “so” important for Serbs? Kosovo is the foundation of Serbian citizenship. It has multiple meanings for Serbs and the Serbian state. Thinking, as a matter, of identity, culture, history, nation and religion. The founding myth of the medieval Serbian state is related to Kosovo. Economically it means a large source of natural resources, mines, energy sources, arable land, but also markets (Orlovic, 2021).

5. Serbian Criminal Organizations Operating in North Mitrovica

In addition to politics and religion, a special place in Serbian parallel structures is also occupied by criminal groups that operate in Serbia and that also extend to North Mitrovica. These criminal organizations connect their activities with “Vidovdan”, which is held as a holiday every year on June 28, where the “Battle of Kosovo” of 1389 is also marked. This movement, which in the Serbian language is called “Pokret 1389”, organizes for every year, the discouragement of the Serbs in Gazimestan.

5.1 “Pokret 1389”, “The Movement 1398”

The 1389 movement, founded in 2004, can be classified as an extreme right-wing movement. It is characterized by Serbian nationalism and maintains a demagogic attitude towards the Kosovo issue. In addition, this organization does not shy away from violence to achieve its goals. The first “primary goal” is “Liberation” and to unite all Serbian territory into a single Serbian state; Serbian territories are considered to be those territories that the Republic of Serbia heads as Greater Serbia, such as North Macedonia and the northern part of Albania. The other primary goal is social justice, which means “confiscation and nationalization of the wealth of politicians who have enriched themselves by stealing from the people and those who have ruined and destroyed the Serbian economy by leaving workers to starve to death in the streets.” The goal of this movement is “the nationalization of Serbian companies bought by foreign companies and the closing of foreign banks that are robbing the people” and “fighting the New World Order such as the European Union, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, etc.” (Bakić, 2013). Members of this movement were also seen in 2011 at the barricades in the north of Kosovo. In the last presidential elections in Serbia, the former leader of this movement, Misha Vacic, was a candidate for president before the civic group “Serb Patriot”. He submitted the signatures for the presidential

candidacy with a torch. The information service of the Serbian right then announced that he arrived at the Republican Election Commission in an “armored jeep with Russian license plates”. In the convoy of vehicles with Serbian and Russian flags, some vehicles had the sign “Z”, a symbol of the Russian occupation of Ukraine (Top Chanel, 2022).

5.2 “Pokret za zaštitu Kosova i Metohije” Movement for the Protection of Kosovo and Metohija

The “Movement for the Protection of Kosovo and Metohija” was founded in 2020 in Serbia, a branch of it was opened in Kosovo in 2022. The main goal of this movement is “the protection of the province as part of Serbia”. The statute of this movement, which has been published on the portal of its website, is “We are all aware that the regime in Serbia, headed by the president of our suffering country, has entered the final stage of handing over the southern Serbian province in the hands of the Greater Albania movement. During the eight years of autocratic rule, no political force was found to prevent this historical madness. Contemporary Skorojevics are throwing our spiritual and cultural pearls before the modern barbarians with the common idea of joining the civilization of the new pagans. No one could stand in the way of the betrayal of the rich medieval country, then the long captivity, heroism and uprisings, the revival of the state and the restoration of the nation in the former European spirit. With external help, they invaded the country internally and now they want to end their national existence with the cold-blooded surrender of its holding symbol - Kosovo and Metohija”, and among other things it is said “The regime and its foreign principles have done ninety nine steps to their common goal. But all those steps aren't worth it if they don't do what's left. They should not be allowed to do this. In the general potential of the people there is the basis for a fatal decision with a clear message: do not dare! Because, if Kosovo, which is the foundation and condition of Serbian identity, is canceled by surrender, and identity is integrity as the ability to preserve itself, then there will be no previous and subsequent progress, real or pretended, of which the government can boast. neither reason nor meaning. A nation that satirizes the state and its own being can only “progress” to its certain destruction. He who, like the current Serbian government, is able to betray “Kosovo and Metohija” by violating the Constitution, will not have any freedom to betray anything, anyone and any national and moral principles⁷

5.3 Serbian Party “Zavetnici”

The establishment of barricades in the North of Mitrovica inspired the establishment of right-wing organizations. Among them is “Zavetnici”, which

⁷ (Председништво и оснивачи - Покрет за одбрану Косова и Метохије (pokretz-aodbranukosovaimetohije.rs) last seen on 20/09/2023 at 21:00

means the Serbian Movement Assembly, “Covenant”. This movement was founded in 2012, by a group of people who gathered at the barricades organized by the Serbian community in the North of Mitrovica, who organized numerous rallies and protests, marked important historical dates, and spread the state-forming thought Patriotism. This movement is now a political party and participated in the last presidential elections held in Serbia. They consider unacceptable the participation of Serbia in the “political pursuit of the state of (Russia), which as a permanent member of the Security Council is the strongest guarantor of Resolution 1244 and the preservation of its sovereignty in “Kosovo and Metohija”. (Kosovo, 2022). On April 3, 2022, this party participated in the Parliamentary elections of Serbia and won 6 seats in the Serbian Parliament (Narodna Skupština, 2022)

6. Russian influence in Kosovo

Russian influence in Kosovo is inevitable, because Russia, through Serbia, considers Kosovo a strategic part in order to keep the security situation in the Southwest Balkans in tension and create conflict situations in Europe. In relation to this influence that Russia has in Kosovo, it is observed through foreign policies and the method of solving the problem. Traditionally, Russia has deployed military troops and special forces or as they are known as 'little green men' throughout the former Soviet space to gain control of territories populated by ethnic Russians. Recently, Russia has been actively following the Gerasimov Doctrine, relying on “the extensive use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures, implemented using the potential for popular protests... [for] the achievement of political and strategic goals, measures which in some cases clearly exceed the force of arms in their effectiveness.” Russia has used oligarchs, journalists, academics, pundits and clerics to engage in influence operations, from the UK to Ukraine, and from Finland to Greece. In Kosovo, Russia's influence is aimed at fulfilling two broad geostrategic objectives, on the one hand providing a Russian alternative to the West, and on the other hand capturing a trampoline in Serbia (both physically and in the harmonization of Serbia's foreign policy with that of Russia). Senior Kosovar and Serbian politicians see Russian influence as part of a 21st-century-style geopolitical game. According to the ex Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, Enver Hoxhaj, the russians are not in Kosovo because they care about the country itself, but to target the Balkans as a whole. As “Russia's interests and capabilities have increased, so has their level of involvement” in the region. The former Minister of Economy of Serbia believes that “Serbia and the rest of the Balkans are chess pieces in the game between the great powers, Russia, the EU and the USA”. As a result of the Kosovo war, Kosovo has become in a way the Berlin of the 21st century, a hotbed of espionage and intrigue, in which global and regional powers (e.g.

USA, EU, Russia, Turkey, Serbia) push and compete for influence and to promote, protect or impose their interests (QKSS, 2020). Russia's actions in the Western Balkans are aimed at freezing the current status quo (in the cases of BiH and Kosovo), preventing NATO and EU enlargement, as well as exploiting weaknesses within and between countries in the region. Toolbox of Russia's influence can be divided into three parts: Coercion, Co-optation and Subversion. Russia prefers to exert its influence at a minimum cost, and such efforts would not be possible without the support of local collaborators. This is why Russian policy in the Western Balkans is mainly focused on fragmentation and subversion rather than on military or non-military forms of coercion (Bechev, 2019). The EU Parliament supports the perspectives of all Western Balkan countries. On April 26, 2022, the Assembly President, Roberta Metsola, noted that the EU should 'think of ways to accelerate the enlargement process in the Western Balkans', because 'stability in the immediate neighborhood is vital for the EU itself. '. The Parliament has expressed concern about Russia's influence in the region and its efforts to destabilize both the region as a whole and individual countries within it (for example, BiH). Parliament is concerned that Russian investments in the region pose high risks of corruption and state capture. She has also called on Serbia to harmonize its foreign policy more closely with the EU. This is also expected by the Assembly, the European External Action Service and the European Commission would improve coordination and address misinformation and hybrid threats that aim to undermine the region's prospects in the EU (European Parliament, 2022). International investigative sources confirmed the names of several other GRU officers. At the beginning of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo, Russian intelligence officials aimed to provoke inter-ethnic unrest to delay the Kosovo status negotiation process and to present Serbian settlements and Serbian Orthodox churches as places at risk. After the declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo, Russian officials in UNMIK tried to portray the work of Kosovo institutions as weak and misrepresented cases of violence against Serbs in Kosovo, which UNMIK then presented in reports and hearings. in the UN Security Council. Russian intelligence officials in UNMIK have been primarily engaged in challenging Kosovo's sovereignty and national security, promising to portray Kosovo as a "failed state". The Russian officers who have served in UNMIK are Igor Kulga. He started his military service in 1986, as a cadet of the Military Academy. After graduation, he went through several positions as an officer in the army of the Russian Federation", wrote Igor Kulga in his biography. His LinkedIn profile states that he is an experienced security guard with a proven track record of working in the international relations industry. Skilled in crisis management, government, emergency management, physical security and strategic planning. A strong professional in the military and security services with a master's degree in public administration from the Russian Presidential Academy of National

Economy and Public Administration. He is currently a UN official in Egypt and his last military position was “Head of Sector in the Department of Military Cooperation”. Igor Kulga was in Kosovo from 2007 to 2010. Olga Mokrova; was in the United Nations Department of Security (UNDSS) in Kosovo, as part of the Military Intelligence Service. According to her profile, she worked as a military intelligence analyst at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) from 2003 to 2006. Mokorova served in Kosovo from 2009 to 2010 and currently works in the Department of National Security of United Nations in Near East. Educated at the Russian Military Academy, Vyacheslav Gannenکو; This officer of the Russian military intelligence service GRU was in Kosovo during 2002 and 2003. Vyacheslav Gannenکو served as part of the Russian police contingent in Kosovo (UNMIK police). He previously served as an information officer of the former the KGB. (The Geopost, 2022). He currently serves as the commander of the Russian police contingent of the United Nations Mission in Sudan, and Alexander Kasatkin worked for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 2007 to 2010. According to international informations, Alexander Kasatkin was a colonel of the Russian Military Intelligence Service (GRU). Before his appointment to UNMIK, he was a member of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He served in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ibid, 2022).

7. Actual Political and Security Situation in North Mitrovica

On January 16, 2018, the well-known Serbian politician Oliver Ivanović was killed by people who shot him from a moving car while Ivanović was in front of his political party's offices in Mitrovica, northern Kosovo. The incident was expected to further exacerbate ethnic tensions - on the very day that Belgrade and Pristina were due to resume talks on normalizing relations between the two countries. But in fact, Ivanović's assassination highlighted the dubious relations and activities in northern Kosovo more than the ethnic tensions between Serbs and Kosovars. Northern Kosovo has been a gray area since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, as the Kosovar authorities and the international community have exercised very little authority over the territory since then. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, and this strained relations between Pristina and Belgrade even more. After the declaration of independence, the European Union created the EULEX mission, to help Kosovo in establishing the institutions of justice and the state. After long negotiations, with the mediation of the United Nations and the EU, the Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013, which was considered a big step forward in the process of opening dialogue between the two former enemy countries. However, the process of implementing the Brussels Agreement has been slow, especially with regard to the creation of an association or merger

of administrative units with a Serbian majority. Relations between Kosovo and Serbia continue to be tense, despite the EU's efforts to reach an agreement between the parties through dialogue. Initially, it was thought that the murder of Oliver Ivanović could be related to political issues, but now it seems that the incident was related to the struggle for influence and control of public funds in the north of Kosovo. (GIATOC, 2019) Politics in northern Kosovo is dominated by a political party, Lista Srpska, which has close ties to the Serbian Progressive Party led by Serbian President Aleksander Vučić. The vice president of Lista Srpska is Milan Radoicic, whose close partner is Zvonko Veselinović, a notorious Serbian businessman who has won several public contracts for construction projects and highways in Serbia and has a popular hotel in Kopaonik. In 2019, Radoicic and Veselinovic were indicted for allegedly running an organized crime ring that was responsible for the January 2018 assassination of rival Serbian political leader Oliver Ivanović. Before his death, in an interview with the Balkan Network of Investigative Journalists, Ivanović described Radoicic as the 'Dark Ruler of Kosovo ['] and a 'key figure in an intimidating system of power in northern Kosovo'. Ivanovic further claimed that Radoicic represented an informal center of power and decision-making in the region (Global Initiative, 2021). Meanwhile, on November 23, 2018, the Kosovo Police conducted a search operation in the north of the country with the aim of arresting Milan Radoicic, who was not found at his location, while four people were arrested during this operation. On December 8, the United States of America imposed sanctions on some Kosovo Serbs. The Serb from Kosovo, Zvonko Veselinovic, together with his brother and 10 other people, entered the black list of the United States of America, after are suspected of committing several acts that contradict the law and are related to organized crime and corruption. His name was often mentioned when it came to the “strongmen” of the Northern part of Mitrovica, but recently the US Department of the United States came out with an announcement that these people have been banned from entering the USA. In addition to Zvonko Veselinovic, the US State Department has announced that Zharko Veselinovic, his brother, then Zhelko Bojic, Milan Mihajlovic, Sinisha Nedeljovic, Radovan Radic, Milan Radisavlevic, Milojkovic Radisavlevic, Milan Radojic, Marko Rosic, Radule Stevič, Milivoje Vulovic ⁸. Due to the situation created in the North of Mitrovica, smuggling of goods and other illegal acts are everyday and are considered common and one of the activities with high economic quality. The Kosovo Police, on May 28, 2019 in the northern part of Kosovo, they arrested 24 people, among them 6 Albanians/Kosovars and a Russian citizen. In the daily newspaper “Koha”, the identities of the smugglers who operate illegally in the north have been published, they are: Sergjan Vullović, who is known by the nickname Gene, as the most important

⁸ Albanian Post, 2022).

of the smuggling network, a person close to Millan Radojčić. Darko Daviq known with the nickname Gjava from Leposavici, who carries out the illegal smuggling activity through Sharpel street in Leposavici. Aleksander Dimitrijević from Leposavici. Dragan Denić and Radosh Petorović are also close to Millan Radojčić. Millan and Millojko Radisavljević, who are known as Babudovci and who operate in Zubin Potok⁹. Fuel is the most frequently smuggled commodity (from north to south). Next come building materials, medicine, cars, cigarettes, food, beverages, and other goods. It is estimated that from these illegal activities the Kosovo budget loses about 750,000 Euros every week from uncollected customs fees: of these 400,000 Euros are fuel fees, 200,000 Euros are lost from construction materials, and 150,000 Euros for other goods. A good part of these goods do not stay in the northern part with Serbian population, but are transported to the south in areas of Kosovo with Albanian population. This shows once again that when it comes to smuggling networks, criminals cooperate with each other regardless of ethnic groups, or geographical and administrative divisions. On the other hand, cooperation between law enforcement forces is limited as a result of disputes regarding jurisdictions, as well as a lack of trust towards the other side. This lack of cooperation makes it even more difficult to accurately assess the true situation on the ground, while this situation makes the work of criminal groups even easier. In addition to the smuggling of excise goods, weapons and drugs (cannabis from Albania, and heroin coming from the Balkan corridors), human trafficking also takes place through this region (coming from the south and passing through the north of Kosovo). Since 2015, this corridor is thought to have been used for the passage of immigrants. (Global Initiative, 2019). One of the main issues that is happening in the North of Mitrovica is the operation of Serbia's energy companies in Kosovo. Thus, according to the Agency for Business Registration in Kosovo, operates the company "Društvo Elektrosever" D.O.O., with business number 8107171900, which was established in 2018 in Northern Mitrovica, The authorized representative of this business is Boban Novaković, while the owners and shareholders are the company from Serbia "JP Elektroprivreda Srbije Beograd". The primary activity of this business is electricity trade. (ARBK, 2022). The security situation in North Mitrovica escalates when the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, on September 1, 2022, in the post of the account on the portal of the social website "Facebook" on his official profile "Albin Kurti", said that, starting from September 1 to October 31, the process of converting vehicle registration plates will take place, he said, that owners of cars with "PR", "KM", "PZ", "GL", "UR" license plates "PE", "DA" and "ĐA" to convert them to RKS plates in the next two months¹⁰. After this statement by Prime Minister Kurti,

⁹ (Koha, 2019).

¹⁰ (Dukagjini, 2022)

on November 13, 2022, on the bust of “Knez Lazar” in North Mitrovica, graffiti was written in the Serbian language “Don't worry. Here we are. We are waiting for you” “NATO Go Home here is Serbia”, “Northern Brigade is growing day by day”, with the symbol “Northern Brigade”. This formation, “Northern Brigades”, are descendants of the criminal groups “Bridge Guards” and “Civil Defense”, the same graffiti was found at the place where police officer Enver Zymberi was killed in 2011 by Serbian criminals¹¹. According to the International Crisis Group, on November 23, 2022, with the mediation of the European Union, Pristina and Belgrade reached an agreement regarding the controversial issue of license plates. In this agreement, Serbia will stop issuing license plates with the names of Kosovo's cities, while Kosovo will cease the requirements to re-register vehicles with Serbian license plates. Due to the issue of signs and non-compliance with the applicable laws of the Republic of Kosovo, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Kosovo, in the first month of November 2022, has suspended from work the chief of police of the north of Kosovo, for refusing of issuing fine warnings to drivers with Serbian license plates. In protest, hundreds of Serbian legislators, judges and policemen resigned from the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo on November 5. Dejan Pantic, was a police officer in the Kosovo Police, was arrested by the same force, because he was the main suspect in the attack on the officials of the electoral commission in North Mitrovica. Pantic, in November 2022, had resigned together with 600 Serbian police officers from the Kosovo Police due to a dispute over license plates. Due to the arrest of Pantic, on December 10, hundreds of Kosovo Serb protesters in the north of the country have set up barricades and exchanges of fire have been reported between law enforcement and protesters, among those attacked were members of the European Union mission. in Kosovo. On December 26, Serbia placed its security forces on the border with Kosovo in a state of full combat readiness. On December 28, Kosovo closed the border crossing point with Serbia. On December 28, the President of Serbia announced that the barricades will be removed, since the Kosovar authorities have changed Pantic's detention under house arrest. The Serbian protesters, the next day, began to remove the barricades on the road, all border crossings were reopened, reducing tensions. (CSI, 2022). Regardless of this agreement between the two parties, the situation in the North of Kosovo remained sensitive, with escalating tendencies. This situation remains in this form, because Serbia and Russia use this part of Kosovo as an “object” to threaten the escalation of the Western Balkans and blackmail the European Union. On 21 April, the main political party in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo, the Serbian List, urged the ethnic Serb community to boycott the elections scheduled for 23 April in four northern municipalities, labeling them as “undemocratic”, after multiple ethnic Serb candidates withdrew from the

¹¹ (Kosovo Sever Portal, 2022).

election. Consequently, only four percent of eligible voters participated. This low turnout led to the election of ethnic Albanian political parties, with the ruling by political party “Vetëvendosje” and the Democratic Party of Kosovo emerging victorious. Following the election results, Milan Radoičić, the vice president of the Serbian List, declared that ethnic Serbs “would never accept” governance by officials elected with such minimal turnout in the northern municipalities. Tensions escalated on 26 May when Kosovo Serbs in three northern municipalities tried to block the newly elected ethnic Albanian officials from entering municipal buildings. The situation turned volatile in the town of Zvečan, where police intervention led to confrontations with the protesters, resulting in dozens of injuries. In response to the clashes, Vučić put the Serbian army on high alert and ordered Serbian troops to the Kosovo border. The situation deteriorated further on 29 May when the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) stepped in to disperse the Kosovo Serb protesters, leading to many injuries, including to approximately 93 NATO troops. On the same day, NATO issued a statement condemning the “unprovoked attacks against KFOR troops” in northern Kosovo as “totally unacceptable”. On 30 May, NATO announced the deployment of an additional 700 troops to Kosovo to stabilize the situation. Tensions persisted in northern Kosovo throughout June, prompting international calls for de-escalation between Belgrade and Pristina. On 3 June, the EU called on Pristina to suspend police operations near the municipal buildings in northern Kosovo and to organize early elections “as soon as possible” in the four municipalities (Security Council Report, 2023). Between 23 and 24 September, 2023 Serb militants initiated an attack on Kosovo police as they responded to a situation where trucks lacking license plates were blocking a bridge in Banjska. This incident resulted in the death of Kosovar sergeant Afrim Bunjaku, who was posthumously honored with the Hero of Kosovo order. Subsequently, the attackers sought refuge within Banjska Monastery, which was eventually retaken by the Kosovo Police. During this operation, three of the militants were killed, six apprehended and a significant cache of weaponry was confiscated. Notably, Serb List Vice-president Milan Radoičić was implicated and later admitted responsibility for the attack, leading to his subsequent arrest¹²

Conclusion and Recommendations

The delay in talks between Kosovo and Serbia will cause tensions in the Security Council of this organization, because the officials of the Russian Federation will constantly use their veto and their mechanisms to prevent Kosovo from joining international organizations, the European Union, etc. Because of this, the Western Balkans remains as a place of crisis which can

¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banjska_attack#cite_note-27 , last seen on 28/10/2023 , 16: 41

produce various critical situations, which can negatively affect the future and stability of the European Union. Likewise, there may be various developments against the general global security due to the interweaving of the interests of some states which aim to extend their influence in these states by using the issue of patriotism and religion as a means of reconciliation with the aim of the rule as easy as possible.

The European Union must be more committed in exercising its influence, in reaching a conclusion regarding these negotiations, because through the exercise of this influence they can show their power, which at the moment is fading due to and the non-punishment of Serbia, which is openly supporting the Russian Federation and is openly justifying the violence that this state exercises against Ukraine, violating the integrity and sovereignty of this country. With this gesture on the part of Serbia, they let it be understood that the war that took place in Kosovo was also sponsored by the Russian Federation, since the same scenarios of the war are also taking place in Ukraine. The European Union, in the role of mediator, is supporting Serbia because this country has won all the rights in the European Union, without considering that this country has been the aggressor in the Western Balkans. In most of the statements of the officials of the European Union, they have said that Serbia has made clear progress on the democratic path and European aspirations, but these officials have never once criticized the Constitution of Serbia, which has the Republic of Kosovo as an annexed territorial part of it. With this gesture, it remains to be understood and left in doubt that the Russian Federation, has its influence in the Western Balkan states, also has influence in some European Union states. The delay in the talks has a negative impact on the aspirations of the Kosovo Police in its acceptance into the organizations for the rule of law "Interpol" and "Europol". This procrastination undermines the efforts of these organizations in their investments that they have made in the Kosovo Police. It is true that the Police of Kosovo is one of the newest organizations of the rule of law, but this organization has the same skills, opportunities and capacity as all the police organizations of democratic states, as it has proven this with its work. Being one of the most trusted organizations in the Republic of Kosovo. With the membership of the Kosovo Police in these organizations, the possibility of fighting terrorism and organized crime will be created more easily by all member states, since these negative phenomena are seriously threatening international law. With the admission of the Kosovo Police to this organization, it will be easier to exchange information and easier access to crime prevention. The delay in talks between Kosovo and Serbia creates the possibility for the Russian Federation to extend its influence and strengthen its ties with the government of Serbia and organized crime, giving them an easier access to the easier manipulation of the citizens of Kosovo and Serbs who live in Kosovo. This undefined status of these talks also affects the strengthening and increasing the influence of the Serbian parallel system

which has been operating in Kosovo since 1999. Due to the operation of this system, Kosovo has suffered a lot in this aspect by presenting themselves incapable of fighting and stopping these illegal institutions that, in addition to not knowing the state of Kosovo, they work to its detriment, obstructing and blackmailing the plenary sessions of the Assembly of Kosovo, in Kosovo institutions, such as the Police and the Kosovo Armed Forces etc. These actions on the part of the Serbian side happen on purpose because of the orchestrated agenda of the Russian Federation which implements it through the Government of Serbia. This phenomenon will have a bad influence and reflection on many unstable states, since the Russian Federation can use the model of Kosovo's rule as a "governance" model even in the states that left the Soviet bloc.

With the procrastination of the negotiations, is being caused considerable damage in the financial and economic aspects of economy of Kosovo, since the possibility of placing local products is much more difficult, and the possibility of promoting them in most cases fails due to of the visa regime procedures which the European Union applies to Kosovo and its citizens. Due to the delay in negotiations, Kosovo and the community that keeps the economy of Kosovo alive, find it impossible or difficult to create the conditions and enable the arrival of foreign investors who, through these investments, would revive and strengthen the income of the population of Kosovo and the strengthening of the economy. In most of the progress reports drawn up by many countries of the European Union, it is stated that in Kosovo, organized crime is at a high level, including criminal offenses of corruption. But, such a thing is normal in a state which was formed by the countries drafting these reports. All this is based on statistics which are calculated, but these statistics could be even smaller if it had not been worked at all. The account of these statistics of the fight against crime and terrorism is true that they can be significantly high but this has the positive meaning which means that work is being done to strengthen the law and international law more than some countries which are only accepted in the enlargement policies of the European Union and some of them are also the states with equal rights in the EU. Then, with this negligence that the European Union is doing towards Kosovo, it is also unfortunate because in all the states of this community there are Kosovar citizens who are known as academics, scientists, doctors of science and medicine, businessmen, etc. who, in addition are contributing to these states, some of them also participate in the politics of these states. Also with delay of negotiations and arriving final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, can provoke and produce more tensions in political and security aspect. Due of this, easily can be repeated another terrorist attack similar like in Banjska village.

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